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Abstract. This paper analyzes the influence of bribery on the evaluation of students at the 
entrance and at the outlet of Government Secondary Schools (GSS) in Cameroon using the 
BANFIELD’s model. The empirical evidence reveals that there is bribery at the entrance and 
at the outlet in GSS. So, students can be registered or pass an exam thanks to “gombo”. The 
couples (student, teacher) and (student, secretary), respectively at the entrance and the 
outlet, are corrupt at a significant threshold of 5% and a P-value of 0%. In the first case 
corruption highlights that students are victims of adverse- selection and the principal of the 
school is victim of moral hazard. In the second, it suggests that the principal is not only 
victim of moral risk but also of adverse selection. 
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1. Introduction 
p to the time when a huge scandal, popularly labeled in Cameroon 
as “l’eau” (exam questions obtained thanks to bribe before the date 
of examination) took place during the official exams of the 
Government Secondary School (GSS) by the end of 1980s, the Minister of 
National Education recognized the practices of bribery in the area of 
education. In fact, the successive regular scandal of those practices urged 
the Minister to clarify the public opinion through the National Television. 
Moreover, in 1993 - 1994, certain examiners subordinated the getting of an 
average mark in a subject to the offer of “gombo” (bribe) during the oral 
part of the advanced level examination. In order to annihilate the 
phenomenon of bribery in the advanced level examination the following 
year, the Minister canceled the oral part of the said examination. However 
most recently the corruption scandals during the July 2020 session of the 
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Baccalaureat examination lead to the leakage of examination questions in 
physics and chemistry. These subjects are rescheduled on the 3 and 4 of 
August 2020.  
Corrupt practices observed in the education system of Cameroon are 
also perceived in many other countries such as Kenya (Kimeu, 2013) and 
Niger (Diallo, 2013), Vietnam (Chow et al., 2013). For example in the last 
country during a recent online survey carried out by the Dan tri journal in 
which almost 20,000 persons participated, 62% of the parents admitted that 
they used their personal knowledge  or paid money to enroll their children 
in the schools of their choice. 
Generally, the perverse effects of these practices in the education sector 
based on the economy are numerous. Gupta et al., (2002) established that 
the rate of school drop out is five times higher than that of countries where 
corruption is higher than in the countries where it is weak. By studying a 
sample of 50 countries, Francis Huang (2008) found that the higher the rate 
of perception of corruption the more the academic results are poor.  
In order to confront this phenomenon, several studies were carried out 
in the last decades by the World Bank, transparency international and 
several universities based on the popular definition that corruption is the 
use of public resources for private purposes. In this framework, some 
authors, such as Diallo (2013), Ngwé (2013) and Leach (2013) studied petit 
corruption that involves individuals at all levels of the education system 
and small sums. Other authors notably Mauro (1997), Tanzi & Davoodi 
(1997) examined the practices of “grand” corruption involving top decision 
makers and important amounts of money. For example, Mauro (1997) 
established that corruption reduces education expenses including those of 
organisation of examinations because it is not easily involve in corrupt 
practices to the benefit of top civil servants in charge of sharing the budget 
among the different sectors of the economy.  
Those studies are important since they have enabled to improve the 
strategies of the fight against corruption. In particular they enabled to 
know that by institutionalizing the right of the population to information 
on activities carried out by government agents in the education sector, the 
later will tend to behave better. But, it remains limited because of the 
absence of knowledge on the origin of phenomenon, in particular small 
corruption. In fact, if theoretical literature offers a more detailed insight 
(Lui, 1985; Kaufman & Wei, 1999) into the specific situations, empirical 
literature, on the other hand remains limited.  
In 2011, within the framework of a book titled “the perception of 
governance and integrity in Cameroon: a quantitative study based on the 
results of the statistical survey of households in Cameroon”, The National 
Institute of Statistics of that country uses its own survey on households to 
determine the percentage of households which pay non regulatory fees 
according to different regimes or solicit the intervention of top personalities 
for the success of their children in exams. More precisely, the institute 
reveals that the percentage of persons who have taken normal exams or 
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competitive entrance exams in the last 12 months before the survey was 
3.1%. In reference the last exams taken and passed, 3.3% of those involved 
claim to have given bribe so as to benefit from the intervention of an 
authority to succeed. This practice is common in 50% of the 12 regions of 
Cameroon. However, it is higher in three regions littoral (excluding 
Douala), Far north and in Yaoundé with proportions of 16%. 9% and 6.4% 
respectively. Also this practice seem to concern mostly users who are not 
poor.  
One of the loopholes of this study is that it does not give information on 
the consequences of corrupt practices. More precisely, on the supply side 
this study does not mention the victims of moral hazard. For example the 
Minister of secondary education who appointed the principal of 
government secondary schools does not know that he collected bribe from 
parents (before admitting their children). 
In addition, on the demand side it remains silent on the victims of 
adverse selection, notably the fact that some parents give bribe to principals 
to obtain certificates but do not know that the certificates are fake. 
The objective of this article is to bridge this gap based on the idea of 
Bandfield (1975)  who thinks that corruption is possible as long as there are 
three types of stakeholders: the mandate (top hierarchy), a mandatory 
(head of institution) and a third party whose gains and losses depend on 
the other stakeholders. If with the help of information asymmetry the 
mandatory collects bribe from users (parents of students) in exchange for 
the success of their children the third party is victim of moral hazard.  
Moreover, if in exchange for the offering of a bribe the users obtains an 
poor quality certificate from the principal, then he is a victim of adverse 
selection. The basic hypothesis of this paper is that bribery and specially 
petty bribery 1  (Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988) often influences the 
evaluation of students. 
Frankly speaking, the functioning of the GSS has been profoundly 
influenced by bribery. This behavior has a negative impact on the 
evaluation of students. a) At the entrance, bribery has greatly influenced 
the decisions of recruitment of students in the GSS. b) At the outlet, bribery 
has determined students’ access to higher classes. As a consequence, the 
credibility of the entire educational system is undermined by bribery. 
The second section will be a review of the literature on the mechanisms 
and factors causing bribery in the educational studies. The third section 
will be a reminder of the teachings of Banfield’s model (1975). The fourth 
section will deal with the typological description of the practices of bribery. 
In the fifth section we analyze the repercussions of these practices in GSS. 
In the sixth section we draw conclusions.  
 
 
 
1 The literature review distinguishes petty of bureaucratic corruption and grand or political 
corruption. 
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2. Literature review 
In the economic analysis of crime, the individual weights the costs and 
the benefits of a loyal act, and compare them to those of disloyal act, and 
then choose the one that maximizes his own interests (Becker, 1968). So, the 
economic agent chooses to corrupt when this act is advantageous to him. 
The initiative for such an action can either come from the agent, the user or 
the both (Yamb & Bayemi, 2015).  
However, in the field of education, it is more likely for an agent to take 
initiative for corrupt action than the user in so far as the state agent has, 
monopoly and discretion power on applications and on decisions he takes, 
and less responsibility for results (Klitgaard, 1989). Monopoly creates 
opportunities for corruption by limiting the ability of citizens to choose 
other providers of education services. If the government is the only 
provider of educational services, students and their parents may be forced 
to pay brides for access. Discretion refers to the autonomy enjoyed by a 
state official in decision making. Teachers and lecturers can abuse their 
power by selling information on examination, soliciting bribes in exchange 
of good grades (Meier, 2013). Das et al., (2004) showed that in Zambia, the 
fixed allowance reached more primary schools than the discretionary 
subsidy to schools by local authorities (90 % against less than 20%). 
Responsibility can be considered as the requirement that educational 
managers are accountable for the results they get. Lack of accountability 
creates opportunities for corruption (Yamb & Bayemi, 2015). 
Cultural aspects can also favor the taking of initiative for corrupt action. 
In fact, in many countries, parents and students make gifts for teachers as a 
token of their gratitude. This poses no problem as long as no benefit is 
expected in return. But this practice can turn into extortion and parents 
who are not rich may feet that their children do not receive proper 
education or fail their exams because they cannot afford to make gifts or to 
pay bribes to teachers or lecturers (Meier, 2013; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
Besides that, countries whose social norms are not based on meritocracy 
often face academic corruption. Corruption adversely affects the principles 
of merit, fairness and impartiality where education is grounded because 
some tax payers or consumers of educational services will receive 
preferential treatment. Those in power and owners of resources try to 
capture the benefits of education for themselves and their families. Elites 
tend to reproduce existing power relations through education, often using 
corrupt practices (Transparency International, 2013). For example, in these 
societies, a person can obtain a diploma or a promotion simply because 
he/she belongs to a certain family without this causing any protest 
(Michelsen Institute, 2006). That’s the case in Cameroon where the success 
in some competitive exams namely those related to public service obeys at 
90 % to the intervention of the authority (Institut national de la Statistique, 
2011). Good students who are not fathered fail. 
According to Meier (2004), there is clear relation between corruption and 
economic factors such as inadequate wages. Those factors can push agents 
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to initiate corrupts acts. Indeed, the low wages in the public service, 
including in educational system, largely explain the trivialization of small 
corruption (Beley & McLaren, 1993). Inadequate and irregular wages or 
accumulated of debts often push teachers to seek additional income. The 
teacher can collect bribes to give a good grade because his salary alone does 
not allow him to make ends meet (Vian, 2006). Salary increase is often used 
as a strategy aim at reducing the financial pressure that leads to corruption. 
Unfortunately, it is not enough to increase salary to end corruption. 
Increase of Wages reduces the attraction to bribes without deleting them. 
As a matter of fact, a high salary may lead to the cancellation or reduction 
of bribes requested by a teacher who was in need; however, greed could 
push the teacher to collect more (Rose-Ackerman, 1998). 
 
3. Banfield’s model 
Education is important for the entire community. In active life, repeated 
dismissals of employees for incompetence in companies are a nuisance to 
the regularity of production and consequently reduce general welfare. The 
education therefore produces positive external effects which justify partial 
or total public financing. That is why the Ministry of National Education 
uses to educate and train the youth. It entrusts this mission to the teaching 
staff in its broad meaning (principal of school teachers, etc.). Parents who 
entrusts their children to the teaching staff expect their offspring to be 
teaching personal and thereby the Government. The relationships between 
the teaching personal, the government and students and thus parents 
permit to define GSS as set of contracts generated by the extension of 
government authority. Banfield’s (1975) is of the opinion that this kind of 
extension creates new circumstances and incitement to bribery that may be 
studied through the principal-agent model (Akerloff, 1970; Ross, 1973). This 
author thinks that bribery is possible whenever there are three types of 
economic intervening parties. A principal, an agent and a third person 
whose profits and losses depend on the agent. An agent becomes corrupted 
if he sacrifices the interest of his principal for his profit and hence violates 
the law. In all cases, the profits and losses of the third party may be 
analyzed in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
If the agent does dissimulate his bribery from his hierarchy and illegally 
satisfies the interest of his principal, what Banfield terms official bribery, 
the victim of moral hazard will no more be the principal but the third 
party. This is true because of the disregard of the engagements between the 
principal and the third party as a result of the tacit contract binding them. 
According to Banfield, if the agent knows the quality of commodities or 
services that he provides to the third person and the latter doesn’t know it 
at all, then knowledge about the commodities or services is said to be 
asymmetrically shared. Be it within the framework of personal bribery or 
official bribery, the third party is a victim of adverse selection because he 
cannot observe the quality of a commodity or service provided to him. 
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4. Empirical analysis  
4.1. Description of the Cameroon educational system 
Heritage of the double domination of French and English the Cameroon 
Educational System is heterogeneous. Here we have GSS and Private 
Secondary Schools. Despite these diversities, the educational system is 
determined by the state which for instance gives out the modalities of 
evaluation of students during final year examinations. 
In 1999, Cameroon population was evaluated at 15 million (56% of the 
population was less than 20 years while the population from 6 to 14 years 
represented 25.1% of the whole population). Its educational system (except 
universities) measured 2591255 students where 71% was from the public 
sector and 29% from the private sector. In 1985-1986, the public sector 
controlled 62.5% of the students population as against 37.5% in the private 
sector. In the same light in 1997, 8964 schools existed. Of this number 29.4% 
were from the private sector and 70.53% where from the public sector 
divided into primary and secondary schools. As concerns the secondary 
schools which is the objective of our investigations, it is made up of 
Government General Schools (colleges, high schools) and Government 
Technical and Commercial Schools, Rural Animation Centers and Home 
Economic Centers. In 1985-1986, the public sector represented 67, 14% of 
schools as against 32,36% for the private sector. From 1985-1997, the public 
sector students population increased at a rate of 8,5%. This evolution can be 
explained by the economic crisis which affected the country since 1986 
hence reducing the purchasing powers of Cameroonians. This therefore 
caused some of the parents to withdraw their children from Private Schools 
which are more expensive and register them in Government Schools which 
are almost free.  Unfortunately, the free education expected by 
Cameroonians has never been given to them. 
 
4.2. Methodology of the investigation 
The sample size was constituted by individuals divided in four 
categories: students’ parents, students, teachers and principals of school 
living in the two main cities of Cameroon: Yaounde and Douala. But 
unfortunately the principals of schools refused answering our questions 
due to their fear of being identified. Of the 7000 students (3000 in Yaounde 
and 4000 in Douala) in GSS interviewed respectively in 7 secondary schools 
for Yaounde and 5 for Douala, 550 teachers (200 in Yaounde in 5 secondary 
schools and 350 in Douala in 7 secondary schools). 450 parents (250 in 
Douala and 200 in Yaounde), we respectively received 580, 350 and 34 
questionnaires dully filled and validated. 
We selected a sample in order to assure the best possible precision of the 
results of average cost. The method of sampling retained is based on the 
targeted population. The method consisted in questioning students and 
teachers at the entrance and at the outlet in the government schools, the 
parents were questioned at their residence. As to what concerns the 
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geographical dispersion of the individuals intreviewed, the ideal aspect is 
that most of them are located in urban areas because the GSS in the rural 
areas do not always have the problem of plethoric population. However, 
we even wanted to equally visit the rural areas but given our limited 
means, we only limited our survey in the two main cities of Cameroon, 
Yaounde and Douala. Corrupters and corrupted avoid to be identified 
because bribery is forbidden by the law. So, it was quite impossible to ask 
them questions directly. But, we asked questions to individuals who were 
very familiar with the behavior of the corrupter and the corrupted. For 
instance, we questioned the students’ parents, the students about bribery 
realized by others students’ parents, the students about bribery practiced 
by others students, the teachers about others students, and so on. In order 
to measure the individuals’ opinions vis-à-vis of bribery, we use the five 
categories of answers according to Likert’ scale: strongly agree, agree, no 
opinion, not disagree, strongly disagree. The choices of the different 
categories of answers were later analyzed through by the test of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov. 
 
5. Results and analysis 
During our investigations we identified two types of bribery: bribery at 
the entrance and bribery at the outlet. The first one relates to the set of 
corruptive practices which permit a student to be admitted in GSS. The 
second one refers to a set of corruptive practices permitting a student to 
pass to higher class, to obtain a final year certificate during official exams, 
or obtain marks during practical exams. 
 
5.1. Briberyat the entrance 
We can summarize results concerning bribery at the entrance in two 
tables. The first one refers to different levels of bribery in relative and 
absolute values. The second one relates to the summarizing table of the 
Kolmogorov statistics from table 1. 
 
Table 1. Diefferent levels of bribery according to Likert’ scale  
Couple 
(corrupter, 
corrupted) 
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree Total 
 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
 Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
 Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
(Parent, 
Principal) 
100 29.4 10 2.9 30 8.8 40 11.8 160 47.1 340 100 
(Parent, 
teacher -
principal of 
school) 
100 28.6 10 2.9 50 14.3 80 22.2 110 31.4 350 100 
(Parent, 
teacher) 
80 23.5 40 11.8 60 17.6 30 8.8 130 38.2 340 100 
Source: Our survey 
 
The results in table 1 show that on average one third (33%) of persons 
(corrupt. Corrupted) do not agree that corruption is practiced during 
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admission into government secondary schools (GSS). On the contrary, on 
average more than half (53.17%) persons (corrupt. Corrupted) agree that 
there are corruption practices during admission into government 
secondary schools. However, this table does not provide any information 
on the victims of adverse selection and moral hazard resulting from 
corruption during admission into government secondary schools. 
 
Table 2. Bribery at the entrance  
Couple (corrupter, 
corrupted) 
Z 
of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
P 
Value in 
% 
Significant level 
in % 
Decision 
Victims of 
adverse – 
selection 
Victims of moral 
hazard  
(Parent, principal 
of school) 
1.647 0.9 5 
H1 (There 
isbribery) 
Parents 
Ministry of 
national 
education 
(Parent, teacher 
principal of school) 
1.291 7.1 5 
H0(There is 
no bribery) 
/ / 
(Parent, teacher) 1.385 4.3 5 
H1(There is 
bribery) 
Parents 
Principal of 
school, Ministry 
of National 
education 
Source: Our survery 
 
Table 2 reveals three couples of bribery at the entrance. 
The couple (parent, principal of school) 
If we choose a 5% significant level, the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
applied on the opinions that parents give "gombo" to the principal of 
schools in order to guarantee the access of their children to higher classes is 
statistically significant. In fact, the P. value which is 0.9 is less than 5%, (H1). 
The distribution of parent’s opinions are not equal from one level of 
Likert’s scale to another. The amounts of "gombo" given to the principal of 
schools van from 25,000 to 200,000) CFA. F2.in one hand, the parents are 
victims of adverse selection since the conditions for succeeding in a 
competitive exam are unknow. In other hand, the Ministry of National 
Education is victim of moral hazard since the principal of school fails to 
respect his commitment towards government. 
The couple (parent, teacher-principal of school) 
The application of the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov on Likert on the 
subject of parents who offer "gombo" to teachers and principals of school to 
facilitate the registration of their children in school gives a P. value of 7.1% 
which is more than the 5% significant level that we selected. Consequently, 
we retain the null hypothesis. It signifies that the distribution of the 
opinions of parents between the last five levels of Likert is equal. Therefore 
the distribution observed is not statistically significant. Then, there is no 
bribery because flic principal of school doesn’t want to share the "gombo" 
with the teacher (who is his direct collaborator). Another reason of rejecting 
the null hypothesis is that the principal of school wants to be seen as an 
 
2 By the time we were writing this paper, on dollar = 650 CFA. F 
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honest person. He doesn’t want to show to his direct collaborator that he is 
corrupted. 
The couple (parent, teacher) 
To make a survey on whether they were parents who corrupt teacher to 
assure the success of their children in the competitive entrance GSS, we 
equally applied the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov. If we chose a 5% 
significant level, we can say that the idea of equal repartition of opinions is 
rejected because that level is more than the P. value which is 4.3%. We 
therefore conclude that the distribution of observed opinions is statistically 
significant (H1). 
The amount of "gombo" which accompanies the transactions between 
the teacher and the parent vary from 25,000 - 200,000 CFA.F. As in the case 
of bribery between students and teachers, the principal of school and the 
Ministry of National Education are victims of moral hazard because the 
teachers do net more respect their contracted engagement. The parents are 
victims of adverse selection as far as the conditions for succeeding in a 
competitive exam are not known. Moreover, the credibility of the school, 
the Ministry and even the entire education system are in a stage where 
testing of students to select the best is falsified. 
 
5.2. Bribery at the outlet 
As in the case of bribery at the entrance, we also have two tables 
concerning bribery at the outlet. The first (table 3) indicates different levels 
of bribery in absolute and relative values. The second (table 4) refers to the 
summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics from the first 
(table 3). 
 
Table 3. Different levels of bribery according to Likert’ scale  
Couple 
(corrupter, 
corrupted) 
Strongly disagree Disagree No opinion Agree Strongly Agree Total 
 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequency 
Frequency 
In % 
frequenc
y 
Couple (student, 
secretary) 2800 48.3 200 3.4 1100 19 700 12.1 1000 17.1 5800 100 
Couple (student, 
teacher)1 2000 37 500 9.3 700 13.0 300 5.6 1900 35.2 5800 100 
Couple (student, 
teacher)2 2500 43.1 300 5.2 1000 17.2 700 12.1 1300 22.4 5800 100 
Couple (parent, 
principal of 
school) 
160 47.1 20 5.9 60 17.6 10 2.9 90 26.5 340 100 
Couple (parent. 
teacher) 150 44.1 10 2.9 9 26.5 20 5.9 70 20.6 340 100 
Source: Our survey 
 
Table 3 reveals that on average almost half (49.26%) of couples 
interviewed do not admit that corruption is practiced at graduation in 
Government Secondary Schools (GSS) whereas on average almost one third 
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(32.08%) of the couples interviewed are of the opinion that bribe is common 
at graduation in GSS. However, this table does not put into evidence the 
victims of moral hazard and adverse selection resulting from corruption 
practices during graduation in government schools. 
 
Table 4. Bribery at the outlet  
Couple 
(corruptu, 
corrupted) 
Z 
of 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
P 
Value 
in % 
Significant 
level in % 
Decision 
Victims of 
adverse – 
selection 
Victims of hazard 
moral 
(Student, 
Secretary) 
2.316 0.0 5 
H1 (There 
isbribery) 
Parents, 
students, 
principal of 
school 
Principal of school 
(Student, 
teacher)3 
1.718 0.5 5 
H1(There is 
bribery) 
Parents, 
students 
Principal of school, 
Ministry of 
national education 
(Student, 
teacher)4 
2.081 0.0 5 
H1(There is 
bribery) 
Students 
Principal of school, 
Ministry of 
National education 
(Parent, 
Principal of 
school) 
1.689 0.7 5 
H1(There is 
bribery) 
Parents, 
students 
Ministry of 
National education 
(Parent, 
teacher) 
1.611 1.1 5 
H1(There is 
bribery) 
Principal of 
school, Ministry 
of National 
education 
Principal of school, 
Ministry of 
National education 
Source: Our survey 
 
Table 4 reveals four couples of bribery at the outlet. 
The couple (student, secretary) 
The test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov applied on the opinions of students 
who buy examination questions from secretaries of the examination 
secretariat gives a P. value equals to 0.00%. If we chose a 5% significant 
level which is more than the P. value, we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the existence of bribery between de students and secretaries 
is statistically significant (H1). The amount of the "gombo" varies from 3,000 
to 15,000 CFA.F per exam question. 
Between the secretaries (agent) and the principal of school, it exist a tacit 
contract whereby the secretary has to preserve the confidentiality of the 
examination questions. As from the moment where the secretary gives 
exam questions to students before the examination date, in exchange of 
"gombo" it is considered that the secretary has violated the tacit contract 
hence causing a moral hazard to the principal of school. This principal at 
the same time is victim of the adverse-selection because he ignores that 
there are some students who never merited a success. 
 
3 In the case of practical exam 
4 In the case of obtaining exams questions before examination 
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Moreover, the student and the parent are victims of adverse-selection. 
The student ignores that the purchase of exanimation question is of very 
bad quality. When the parent registers his child in a school where bribery is 
practiced, to him, his child’s success is already guaranteed since the success 
will be based on "gombo". The "gombo" which is given to the secretary can 
either be from the parent or from the student himself. In the first situation, 
bribery can be qualified as a family issue in the case where the bribery act is 
from the agreement between two members of the same family. In the 
second case, the student carries a corruptive transaction without the 
knowledge of the father. This can be qualified as solitary bribery. Whatever 
be the case, the success of the student is not merited and the student is not 
also well trained. 
The advantages of student who is a corrupter is the economy of working 
time (he can engage in extra school activities or leisure) and energy (he 
does not furnish any intellectual effort). At the level of losses, the student 
obtains the certificate but not longer furnishes any knowledge. Moreover, 
the student engages in irrational financial expenses by giving "gombo" to 
secretaries which will never permit to improve his performance. 
The couple (student, teacher) 
The survey reveals that the corruption between student and teachers is 
realized in two cases. The first one takes place during practical exams and 
the second one takes place before the exam date in order to obtain 
examination questions. 
The opinions sampled on the cases of students corrupting teachers 
during practical exams (end of course exams) was realized by the 
application of the analysis on the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov. If we chose 
a 5% significant level, we can say that the null hypothesis which reflects the 
equal allocation opinions will be rejected because the P. value calculated 
which is 0.5% is less than the significant level (H1). We therefore conclude 
that the opinions are statistically significant. The amounts of this "gombo" 
vary from 3,000 to 20,000 CFA.F. Moreover, 46.3% students disagree that 
the service given to them by teachers are of bad quality. They don’t know 
that positive results without merit will be sanctioned in the labor market. 
Parents are also victims of adverse-selection whether they are accomplices 
or not. In the case that they are accomplices, the effect of adverse-selection 
is justified by the fact that the diploma or certificate obtained will be of no 
value in the labor market. In the other cases, the parents are victims of 
adverse-selection because they ignore that the diplomas offered to their 
children are falsified. 
The application of the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov on the subject of 
"gombo" given to teacher by students so on to obtain examination 
questions before the exams date reveals that a 5% significant level is more 
than the P. value equal to 0%. We reject the null hypothesis. The amounts 
of "gombo" vary from 3,000 to 15,000 CFA.F. 
At this level, students are victims of adverse-selection but ignore the fact 
that the services given to them by the teachers are of bad quality. The 
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principal of school and his Minister suffer from moral hazard due to the 
non-respect of the engagement contract by the teachers. 
The couple (parent, principal of school) 
The opinions sampled on the subject of parents giving money to the 
principal of schools so that their children should be promoted in higher 
classes without having the required average is statistically significant. In 
fact, if we choose a 5% significant level which is more than the P. value 
(0.7%), we reject the null hypothesis. The amounts of "gombo" vary from 
25,000 to 150,000 CFA, F. 
It appears that the parents and their children are victims of adverse-
selection because they ignore that the services given to them by the 
principal of school are of bad quality since the principal of school abuses 
the confidence placed on him by his Ministry. 
The couple (parent, teacher) 
At 5% significant level, the test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov applied on the 
opinions that parents give "gombo" to teachers to permit their children to 
pass to higher classes without having the required average 15 statistically 
significant because the P. value which is 1.1% is less than 5% (H,). The 
amounts of the "gombo" vary from 25,000 to 100,000 CFA.F. The principal 
of school and the Ministry are victims of adverse-selection, because they 
have been abused by the teacher. Moreover parents and their children are 
also victims of adverse-selection because they ignore the fact that the 
services given to them are of bad quality. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Finally, this paper shows that corruption practices observed in GSS 
generate adverse-selection and moral hazard. Considering the case of 
bribery at the outlet, students are victims of adverse-selection since they 
ignore that the services given to them by teachers are of bad quality. At this 
level, the Ministry of National Education is a victim of moral hazard as well 
as a parent who is also victimized when his brilliant child fails an 
examination because "gombo" was not offered to the principal of school. 
Moreover, bribery at the entrance and at the outlet equally increases the 
charges of the education users. In fact, admitting a student in the GSS 
through "gombo" requires an amount varying between 25,000 to 200,000 
CFAF. As concerns admission in a higher class certain parents offer to 
teachers amount varying between 25,000 to 100.000 CFA. F. This additional 
expenditure gives advantages to dull students and disadvantages to clever 
student who have not got the means to offer the "gombo" because it would 
have been used for other things. Worst of all, the users do not obtain the 
required training since their problem is to obtain the diploma and not the 
knowledge. In the second case, the wasted amount is equally analyzed as in 
the preceding case. The practice of bribery observed in GSS in Cameroon 
really discredit the educational system in Cameroon hence hindering the 
development of the country. 
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 The question asked is to know “what needs to be done to put and end 
to this phenomenal?” Or at least “how to greatly reduce it?”. The next 
article will permit us to have an answer to this question. 
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Appendixes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1. Summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics from Table 1  
 (Corrupter, corrupted) Z of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
P. value in % Decision 
 (Parent, principal of 
school) 
1.647 0.9 H1 (There is bribery) 
 (Parent, teacher-
principal of school) 
1.291 7.1 
H0 (There is no 
bribery) 
 (Parent, teacher) 1.385 4.3 H1 (There is bribery) 
Source: Our survey 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 2. Summarizing table of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistics from Table 3 
Couple (corrupter, corrupted) 
Z of Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 
P. value 
in % 
Decision 
(Student, secretary) 
2.316 0.0 
H1 (There is 
bribery) 
(Student, teacher) in the case of 
practical exam 
(student, teacher) in the case of 
obtaining exams questions before 
examination 
1.718 0.5 H1 
2.081 0.0 
 
H1 
(Parent, principal of school) 1.689 0.7 H1 
(Parent. teacher) 1.611 1.1 H1 
Source: Our survey 
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